The ring signature can guarantee the signer's anonymity. Most proposed ring signature schemes have two problems: One is that the size of ring signature depends linearly on the ring size, and the other is that the signer can shift the blame to victims because of the anonymity. Some authors have studied the constant-size ring signature and deniable ring signature to solve these two problems. This paper shows that an identity-based ring signature scheme with constant size has some security problems by using an insecure accumulator and its verification process does not include the message m. Then we combine the concepts of "constant-size" and "deniable" to form an id-based deniable ring signature with constant-size signature. The new scheme with constant-size signature length is proposed based on an improved accumulator from bilinear pairings and it solves the problem of anonymity abuse.
Introduction
Ring signature was first introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in 2001 [1] to provide anonymity for the message signer. In a ring signature scheme, the message signers form a ring of any set of possible signers and himself. The actual signer can then generate a ring signature entirely using only his secret key and the others' public keys without the assistance or even awareness of the other ring members. However, the generated ring signature can convince an arbitrary verifier that the message was indeed signed by one of the ring members while the real signer's identity is totally anonymous to the verifier. Ring signatures have been shown as a powerful tool for applications in the field of management, military affairs, politics, economics and the like. It plays a very important role in keeping the confidential information, voting for the crucial leaders, carrying out the e-business, press releasing and so on. Bersson et al. [2] proved the security in the random oracle model of the scheme proposed in [1] and presented the notion of a threshold ring signature scheme, and applied it to Ad-hoc networks. In 2002, ID-Based ring signature [3] was first introduced by Zhang et al. Tang et al. found some weakness of the scheme in [3] and proposed an enhanced scheme [4] .
ID-based cryptosystem was first introduced by Shamir [5] . In an ID-based cryptosystem, each user's identity information can be used as his public key and can be used to generate his private key by a trust key generation center. The advantage is that the key distribution is easier than the conventional ones. In 2001, Boneh et al. proposed a practical id-based signature scheme from bilinear pairings [6] .
As the verifier needs to know the information of ring members, the signature length of many proposed ring signature schemes is linear with the number of ring members which is inefficient especially when the ring size is large. Some authors have studied the constant size of ring signature scheme and some schemes with constant size signature length have been suggested [7, 8, 9] .
In some situations, the ring signature scheme allows the signer to shift the blame to victims because of its anonymity called "anonymity abuse". In [10] , Y. Komano et al. propose a new concept of a deniable ring signature scheme which can allow the non-signer to deny the signature and solve the anonymity abuse problem. This paper suggests that there are some problems in a constant size id-based ring signature scheme [9] whose verification process does not include the message information and the weakness of the used accumulator leads to some security problems. Then we combine the concepts of "constant-size" and "deniable" and form an id-based deniable ring signature with constant-size signature. The new scheme with constant-size signature length is based on an improved accumulator from bilinear pairings and it solves the problem of anonymity abuse.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review bilinear pairings and some related complexity assumptions briefly and a accumulator. In Section 3, we analyze a constant-size id-based ring signature scheme and present a new id-based deniable scheme. The security analysis is given in Section 4. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 5.
Preliminaries
For convenience, throughout the paper we use the following notations. Z p denotes all positive integer which is less than p. Z * p denotes multiplicative group modulo p. The notation x ∈ R X denotes that x is selected randomly from the set X. We let {0,1} l be the bit string of length l.
A. Bilinear Pairings.
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P, with a prime order p, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same prime order p. Let e : G 1 ×G 1 G 2 be a map with the following properties [11] : 1) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 , a, b ∈Z * p ; 2) Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) ≠ 1; 3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 ;
B. Accumulator.
An accumulator is a tuple ({X l , F l }) where l ∈ N, { X l } is called the value domain of the accumulator; and { F l } is a sequence of families of pairs of functions such that each (f, g) ∈F l is defined as: f : U f × X f U f and g : U f U g is a bijective function. In addition, the following properties are satisfied:
Efficient generation: There exists an efficient algorithm that takes as input a security parameter l and outputs a random element (f, g) ∈F l , possibly together with some auxiliary information a f . Quasi commutativity:
For any l∈N, (f, g)∈F l , and X={x 1 ,…, x q }⊂X l , we call g(f(f(u, x 1 ),…, x q )) the accumulated value of the set X over u. Due to quasi commutativity, the value f(f(u, x 1 ),…, x q ) is independent of the order of the x i and is denoted by f(u,X). Efficient evaluation: For every (f, g)∈F l , u∈U f and l X X ⊂ with size bound by a polynomial of l: g(f(u,X)) is computable in time polynomial in l, even without the knowledge of a f . In this paper, an improved accumulator [12] from the one in [13] with some security measures is used to construct our constant-size length scheme. The basic accumulator is: Let e : G 1 ×G 1 G 2 be a bilinear map, the parameter t = (P, P pub =sP, …, s q P), s∈ R Z * p , q is the max number of members to be accumulated. (f, g) is defined as Z p ×Z p Z p , g : Z p G 1 , namely f:(u,x) (x+s)u, g:u uP.
Our deniable constant-size id-based ring signature scheme
We don't describe the scheme in [9] in detail. The verification process of the scheme in [9] does not include the message information, so that the verification can not check whether the signature is corresponding to the message m. Meanwhile, Zhang et al. [14] pointed that there are flaws with the accumulator from [13] used by the scheme which make the accumulator forgeable and lead to some security problems of the scheme in [9] .
In this section, we present our new ID-based deniable ring signature scheme from bilinear parings. The construction method of our scheme is similar to the scheme in [9] , but our scheme is based on the improved accumulator from bilinear pairings [12] . The scheme includes system setup, user key generation, ring signature and verification.
1) Setup(l) On a security parameter l, chooses a bilinear map: e:G 1 ×G 1 G 2 , where P is a generator of G 1 . Generates tuples t'=(P, P pub =sP, …, s q P), s∈ R Z * p , q is the max number of members to be aggregated. Chooses randomly P 0 , Q, H, K ∈ R G 1 , u, s m ∈ R Z * p , computes Q pub =s m Q. Generates an instance of the accumulator above, including functions (f, g) that f : (u, a) (a + s m )u, g : u uP. H 1 :{0,1}* Z p , H 2 :{0,1}* G 1 and publics the system parameters(l, e, P, P 0 , t', f, g, Q, H, K, Q pub , u, H 1 , H 2 ), s, s m is the system master key and H 2 is just used in confirmation and disavowal.
2) KeyGen(id) U id selects his secret key x id and sends committed value x id P to KGC. KGC extracts private key S id for U id as
3) RSign(m, S id ) Let {id 1 ,…, id n }, n≤q be the ring of users, and m be the message to be signed. The real signer is id s . The signer computes X={H 1 (id 1 ),…, H 1 (id n )}, X'=X\H 1 (id s ), V = g(f(u,X)), W = g(f(u,X')), h idj = H 1 (id j ). The signer firstly checks whether: e(h ids P+P pub , S id ) = e(x id P+P 0 , P) and e(h ids Q+Q pub , W) = e(Q, V) If the check fails, then the signer declares that KGC generates wrong user private key and stops. Otherwise, the signer chooses randomly r 1 , r 2 , k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , k 5 , k 6 ∈ R Z p and computes g(f(u,X) ). Then the verifier checks the following equalities:
T 1 = s 1 R 2 -s 4 K, T 2 =s 1 R 1 -s 6 K, T 3 =s 3 K+cR 2 , T 4 =s 5 K+cR 1 , ∏ 1 = e(P,U 1 ) s1 e(P,H) -s6 e(P pub , H) -s5 e(P,P) -s2 [e(P 0 ,P)/e(P pub , U 1 )] c , ∏ 2 = e(Q,U 2 ) s1 e(Q,H) -s4 e(Q pub , H) -s3 [e(Q,V)/e(Q pub , U 2 )] c If all the checks pass, then the signature is valid.
Security Analysis
Firstly, our scheme is correct. For a valid signature σ, we have: 6 -cr 1 h ids )K=T 2 ; s 3 K+cR 2 =(k 3 -cr 2 )K+cR 2 =k 3 K =T 3 ; s 5 K+cR 1 =(k 5 -cr 1 )K+cR 1 =k 5 K =T 4 ; e(P,U 1 ) s1 e(P,H) -s6 e(P pub , H) -s5 e(P,P) -s2 [e(P 0 ,P)/e(P pub , U 1 )] c =e(P,U 1 ) k1-chids e(P,H) -k6+cr1hids e(P pub , H) -k5+cr1 e(P,P) -k2+cxids [e(P 0 ,P)/e(P pub , S ids +r 1 H)] c = e(P,U 1 ) k1 e(P,H) -k6 e(P pub , H) -k5 e(P,P) -k2 =∏ 1 ; e(Q,U 2 ) s1 e(Q,H) -s4 e(Q pub , H) -s3 [e(Q,V)/e(Q pub , U 2 )] c = e(Q,U 2 ) k1-chids e(Q,H) -k4+cr2hids e(Q pub , H) -k3+cr2 [e(Q,V)/e(Q pub , W+r 2 H)] c = e(Q,U 2 ) k1 e(Q,H) -k4 e(Q pub , H) -k3 =∏ 2 So our scheme satisfies correctness. Secondly, our scheme satisfies anonymity. From Lemma1 of [12] , we can get that under the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G 1 , the signature (m,U 1 ,U 2 ,R 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 ,R 4 ,T 1 ,T 2 ,T 3 ,T 4 ,∏ 1 ,∏ 2 ,s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 ) is a perfect zero knowledge proof of knowledge of (h ids ,S ids ,x ids ,W) that e(h ids P+P pub , S id ) = e(x id P+P 0 , P) and e(h ids Q+Q pub , W) = e(Q, V).
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The two signatures (m,U 1 ,U 2 ,R 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 ,R 4 ,T 1 ,T 2 ,T 3 ,T 4 ,∏ 1 ,∏ 2 ,s 1 ,s 2 ,s 3 ,s 4 ,s 5 ,s 6 ) and (m,U' 1 ,U' 2 ,R' 1 ,R' 2 ,R' 3 ,R' 4 ,T' 1 ,T' 2 ,T' 3 ,T' 4 ,∏' 1 ,∏' 2 ,s' 1 ,s' 2 ,s' 3 ,s' 4 ,s' 5 ,s' 6 ) have the same distribution. So our scheme satisfies anonymity.
Thirdly, our scheme is unforgeable. Suppose an PPT adversary A can forge a ring signature (m,U' 1 ,U' 2 ,R' 1 ,R' 2 ,R' 3 ,R' 4 ,T' 1 ,T' 2 ,T' 3 ,T' 4 ,∏' 1 ,∏' 2 ,s' 1 ,s' 2 ,s' 3 ,s' 4 ,s' 5 ,s' 6 ). Then given a q-SDH instance (P, zP, …, z q P), z∈ R Z * p , we can construct a PPT algorithm B to solve the q-SDH problem using A. That is to say, B can compute
Given the public system parameter (l, e, P, P 0 , t', f, g, Q, H, K, Q pub , u, H 1 , H 2 ), t'=(P, zP, …, z q P), B chooses users {id 1 ,…, id k }, k≤q and computes V. For the user whose identity is id, B can forge new h', W'. Based on the properties of accumulator, we have (h'+z)W'=∏ (h i +z)uP.
Let f(z)= ∏(h i +z)uP, then expand it to f(z)=∑c i z i where c0≠0.
As (h'+z)W'=∏ (h i +z)uP, this can be represented as (h'+z)W'=uf(z)P that is Finally, the non-signer in our scheme can deny the signing action of a ring signature. When the a signer i tries to shift the blame to user j, then the user j can interact with the verifier to claim the false charge. The protocol is executed as follows:
1) The verifier selects randomly
and sends H 2 (m) to user j; 2) User j chooses randomly p Z r ∈ and computes rH 2 (m), rS j , rP, rH. Then user j sends them with x j P to verifier;
3) The verifier checks e(h j P+P pub , rS j ) = e(x j P+P 0 , rP), e(rH 2 (m), P) = e(H 2 (m), rP), e(rH, P) = e(H, rP). If not all checks succeed, then user j give the wrong information and the verifier stops the protocol; 4) Otherwise, the verifier checks whether e(U 1 (m), rP) = e(rS j , P)e(rH, R 3 ). If the checks fails, then the verifier can confirm that user j is not the real signer. Otherwise, user j is the real signer. The user must calculate rH 2 (m), rS j , rP, rH with right form, otherwise the checks in step 3) will certainly fail. Consider that the real signer get the victims' rS j , but as he can't get r, so he can't get right rH 2 (m) for m randomly selected by verifier.
MorMoreover, in the protocol, there is not a trusted third party who revokes the anonymity and the user need not leak his secret key.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the constant-size id-based ring signature scheme in [9] and suggest that there are some drawbacks in the scheme. Then, based on bilinear pairings and improved accumulator, a new constant-size id-based deniable ring signature scheme is proposed and we prove that our scheme provides anonymity, unforgeability and deniability. The suggested scheme solves the problem of anonymity abuse.
